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This thesis examined existing models that attempt to
explain the decrease in the growth of Soviet defense
expenditures. Two new models were also developed. The
first used the mean of a high and low estimated dependent
variable in the existing models, and the second added a
different independent variable to the models. Likelihood
ratios, chi-squared tests, and Chow tests were used in
conjunction with the regression models to show a mid-70s
change in Soviet leaders* attitudes toward defense needs.
The major conclusion of this study was that there was a
definite break in the regressions that indicated a change in
Soviet defense policy. When all the variables were used,
the models exhibited a post-break increase in the growth of
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 Economist Paul R. Gregory presented a simple
model which sought to explain real Soviet defense
expenditures in terms of Soviet economic growth and real
U.S. defense spending. The model showed Soviet defense
spending to be a statistically significant and positive
function of both Soviet GNP and U.S. defense expenditure.
Specifically a 1% increase in U.S. defense spending brought
about roughly a 0.6% increase in Soviet defense spending and
a 1% increase in Soviet GNP brought about approximately a
0.7% increase in Soviet defense expenditures [Ref. 1].
Information on Soviet defense spending is hard to come
by. It is a closely guarded state secret. Only one defense
figure is published in the state budget each year and it is
uninformative because its scope is not defined and its size
appears to be manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes.
Economists such as Gregory tried to determine Soviet defense
expenditures through the use of models that use more
accurate variables. The CIA on the other hand uses a
complex costing methodology to estimate Soviet defense
expenditures. Data collected by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) indicate that the growth of Soviet defense
expenditures has decreased since 1977.
In a study using the Gregory model as a basis, Josef C.
Brada and Ronald L. Graves attempted to test alternative
hypotheses regarding the causes of the slowdown in Soviet
defense expenditures that occurred in the mid-1970s [Ref.
2]. Their models used high and low Soviet defense
expenditure estimates to determine parameter estimates for
their equations. The parameter estimates using the high
Soviet defense expenditure estimates resulted in different
conclusions from the parameter estimates using the low
expenditure estimates.
The primary investigative effort of this thesis was to
examine, using statistical analysis, the Brada and Graves
study and to determine the effect on the parameter estimates
of the determinants of Soviet defense expenditures if the
mean estimated values of Soviet defense expenditures for the
period 1960-1984 are used instead of high and low estimates.
The second chapter of this thesis explained the
variables used in the four different models that were
developed by Brada and Graves for the purpose of forecasting
Soviet defense expenditures.
The essence of the thesis is contained in the chapters
on the description of the models and on data presentation.
They give a precise step by step development of the
hypothesis testing through the use of regression analysis,
likelihood ratios, chi-square procedures, and the Chow test.
Also, a model was developed with a different variable to
determine if the explanatory power could be increased. The
same methods of hypothesis testing as the previous models
were used with the addition of testing in lagged form.
The concluding chapters showed, through the use of the
various models and statistical tests, that the change in
Soviet defense expenditures in the mid-1970s was not solely
a natural response to exogenous variables that constrain
Soviet decisions regarding the level of defense expenditure,
but a response both to exogenous variables and to the Soviet
leaders' perceptions of defense needs.
II. BACKGROUND
Economist Paul R. Gregory believes that real Soviet GNP
and real U.S. defense outlays are the two primary factors in
explaining Soviet defense expenditures. His rationale is
that in the Soviet Union, as in other economies, real
economic growth generates real growth in revenues which the
state must then allocate among a myriad of programs. With a
constant allocation rate, defense expenditures would tend to
remain a fixed proportion of Soviet GNP and would grow
proportionately with the growth of GNP. Any variation in
Soviet GNP would explain variations in the defense
expenditure. However, allocated proportions for Soviet
defense have varied substantially over time in the Soviet
Union. This requires consideration of a second factor that
causes variation in the ratio of real Soviet defense
expenditures to real Soviet GNP. This second factor is real
U.S. defense outlays. Gregory assumes that increases in the
Soviet defense budget are based upon the Soviet leadership's
perception of real military needs. The idea here is that
because the United States has been the Soviet Union's major
competitor in the military sphere, the Soviet leaders'
perception of their military needs must have been fashioned
to a large extent by changes in U.S. military expenditures.
since the Gregory model was developed, data on Soviet
defense expenditures compiled by the CIA indicate that the
rate of growth of Soviet defense expenditures has decreased
since 1977. The CIA and a number of other analysts believe
that the slowdown is caused primarily by two objective
factors that constrain the ability of the Soviet Union to
maintain a higher rate of growth of defense expenditures.
According to the CIA, the first factor is the decline of
aggregate Soviet economic growth. For future Soviet
economic growth and for continuation of specific programs
such as energy conservation and production, the
modernization of industry, and the development of Siberia
and its natural resources, capital formation is critical.
This is a price effect because investment needs in other
industries increased the cost of defense. This, combined
with an income effect, where a slowdown in the growth of GNP
caused a slowdown in the growth of Soviet defense
expenditures, increases the burden of the defense
expenditures greatly. Therefore, the decline in the
expansion of the share of national income devoted to defense
implies that the slowdown in aggregate economic growth has
constrained the growth of national defense expenditures.
The second factor causing the slower growth of Soviet
military spending, according to the CIA, is that the
technological and physical bottlenecks that plague the
civilian economy have also spilled over into the defense
sector. Because of technological difficulties in making new
weapons systems function properly and also because of
difficulties in organizing the production of new weapons,
the Soviets have had to stretch out the procurement of such
new systems thereby reducing defense expenditures below what
the Soviets would wish to spend even with a slowing economy.
To summarize up to this point, Gregory believes that two
variables—Soviet GNP and U.S. defense expenditures—affect
Soviet defense expenditures. The CIA believes that two of
the variables that have affected the Soviet defense
expenditure are Soviet GNP and factor productivity growth.
An alternate view is that Soviet defense expenditures
are affected by the three variables noted above—Soviet GNP,
factor productivity growth, and U.S. defense expenditures
—
plus a fourth variable which is the slowdown in the Soviet
acquisition of additional strategic weapons. This slowdown
could be caused by one of two factors. The first is that
the Soviet leaders' may have come to believe that they had
reached their objective of strategic parity with the United
States. The second is that Soviet military doctrine may
have switched from an emphasis on winning a nuclear exchange
to a policy that regarded nuclear exchanges as unwinnable
and thus downplayed the emphasis on strategic parity and
placed greater emphasis on conventional warfare.
In summary, four factors are believed to determine the
amount of Soviet defense expenditures. They are Soviet GNP,
real United States defense expenditures, growth of Soviet
factor productivity in industry (which correlates to the
technological and production bottlenecks) , and the ratio of
deliverable Soviet warheads to deliverable U.S. warheads
(which correlates to the slowdown in the Soviet acquisition
of additional strategic weapons) . The first three variables
are basically exogenous and not controlled by Soviet
leaders. The fourth variable is determined more by the
Soviet leaders and their view of military needs.
With these variables, statistical models can be used to
determine whether the slowdown in Soviet defense
expenditures represents a strictly natural response to
changes in the exogenous variables that determined the level
of defense expenditures, or whether Soviet decisionmakers in
the mid-1970s changed their views regarding the level of
defense expenditures.
Which of the two explanations considered in the above
paragraph is right should heavily influence the United
States' defense policy. If Soviet GNP and U.S. defense
expenditures are the only influential determinants of Soviet
defense expenditures, then an increase in U.S. defense
spending could cause two possible outcomes. First, the
Soviet Union would not be able to follow suit and would find
itself at a military disadvantage. Second, the Soviet Union
could also increase its defense expenditures at the cost of
neglecting its economy and therefore causing economic
stagnation. This in the long run would make the Soviet
Union even more incapable of meeting its military needs.
In the case of the second interpretation of the slowdown
in Soviet defense expenditures (that the Soviet leadership's
changed perceptions of defense needs are dependent on more
variables than just U.S. defense expenditures and Soviet
GNP) , an increase of defense expenditures by the United
States would have undesirable consequences for the following
reasons:
1. If Soviet defense expenditures are only partly limited
by objective factors and partially governed by self-
restraint, it would be possible for the Soviet Union
to increase its defense expenditures without
neglecting its economy and causing economic
stagnation.
2. The Soviet Union would be less likely to practice as
much self-restraint as it has in the past if the
United States increased its defense expenditure growth
rate.
3. The Soviet Union could view a United States increase
in defense expenditure as a means to gain military
superiority, thereby making relations based on mutual
trust and restraint in the future difficult to
establish.
III. METHODOLOGY
Josef C. Brada and Ronald L. Graves developed the models
being investigated in this thesis by adding variables to a
model first developed by Paul Gregory. Gregory tested two
hypotheses in generating his model. First, he hypothesized
that real Soviet defense outlays depend on the aggregate
level of output in the Soviet Union as measured by real
Soviet GNP. Second, he hypothesized that the fraction of
GNP devoted to defense was positively related to the level
of defense outlays in the United States. It was explained
in the previous chapter that Gregory believed that the
relationship between United States and Soviet defense
expenditures exists because the Soviet leadership is
compelled to react to the changes in military capability of
the United States. Converting the variables to natural
logarithms, Gregory estimated the following model:
logSDt = a + bi logUSD^ + b2 logSY^ +6^ (1)
where:
SD^ = real Soviet defense outlays in year t
USD^ = real United States defense expenditures
in year t
SY-t = real Soviet GNP in year t
e-j- = error term.
The regression results that Gregory obtained from
Equation (1) , using the data in Appendix A, are given below.
Regression Results
constant (a) logUSD (b^) logSY (b2) Coefficient of
-4.28 0.593 0.708 multiple determina-
(7.82) (2.72) (8.68) tion (R^) = 0.83.
Standard error =





' The regression results suggest that both U.S. defense
expenditures and the magnitude of Soviet GNP exert positive
and significant impacts on the level of Soviet defense
expenditures. As can be seen from the large t-values (2.72
and 8.68), both variables are significant at the 0.05 level.
Because the regression model is in double-logarithm form,
the individual coefficients show the percentage change in
the dependent variable (SD) brought about by a given
percentage change in the explanatory variable (USD or SY)
.
Thus, the model suggests that a 1% increase in U.S. defense
expenditures will bring about a 0.59% change in Soviet
defense expenditures in the same direction.
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Three tests were performed on the model to determine
whether alternative models and variable specifications might
provide a better explanation of Soviet defense expenditures.
First, an attempt was made to determine the timing of
the impact of U.S. defense expenditures on SD. In other
words, do Soviet defense expenditures depend on this year's
U.S. defense spending, on last year's, etc., or on some
combination of current and past expenditures?
Statistically, the issue may be investigated by entering USD
in lagged form. Gregory limited his investigation to a
three-year maximum lag and entered USD^^, USD2 , and USD3 in
addition to current USD as explanatory variables. The
bottom line is that the original unlagged simple model
(Equation (1)) provides an explanation of Soviet defense
spending as good as or better than the more complicated
dynamic lagged models estimated. Gregory suggests that the
Soviets are responding to forecasts of United States defense
expenditures rather than to actual amounts.
The second test was to determine whether Soviet defense
expenditures tend to respond to real U.S. defense
expenditures (in constant dollars) as originally postulated
in model (1) or, in a less sophisticated manner, to U.S.
defense expenditures in current dollars unadjusted for price
increases in the defense sector. To test this particular
issue, Gregory re-estimated model (1) and the lagged models
described immediately above by substituting U.S. defense
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expenditures in current dollars for real U.S. defense
expenditures. It was noted by Gregory that the original
model tends to explain Soviet defense expenditures better
than the re-estimated current dollar model.
The third and final test was to determine to what extent
the results in model (1) simply indicate a common upward
time trend affecting both the dependent and explanatory
variables in a common manner. The way to deal with this
question is to eliminate the time trend by redefining the
original variables as first differences (annual changes)
rather than in absolute terms as was done in model (1) .
Thus, a :SD, for example denotes the positive or negative
annual change in real Soviet defense expenditures.
Similarly, other variables in model (1) are ^USD and iSY.
The estimated first-difference regressions are recorded
below.
SD = 0.082 + 0.055 USD - .003ASY R^ = 0.11
(1.96) Standard error = 0.087
SD = 0.054 + 0.054 aUSD R^ = 0.16
(2.02) Standard error = 0.084
While Soviet GNP (SY) accounted for a substantial
portion of the variation in SD in model (1) , its rate of
change (:-SY) failed to exert a statistically significant
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influence on the rate of change of Soviet defense
expenditures (z^SD). I assume that Gregory did not show a t-
statistic in his regression for ASY because 0.003 exerts
such little influence on the variable that it makes no
difference whether the variable itself is significant.
Rather, the important variable explaining variation in the
rate of change of Soviet defence expenditures is the rate of
change of U.S. defense expenditures. This can be seen from
the estimated first-difference regressions above. The
conclusion to be drawn from Gregory's models is that the
growing size of the Soviet economy does tend to pull up
Soviet defense expenditures over the long run, but that
short-term variation around this rising trend is caused not
by variation in the rate of economic growth but by variation
in U.S. defense spending.
In a replication of the Gregory regressions, I came up
with different parameter estimates (Appendix A) . In
Equation (1) replication all the parameters are lower and
the USD variable is not significant at the 0.10 level. In
the replication of the estimated first-difference
regressions, the constant differs by a factor of ten and the
r2 is more relevant. These differences were probably due to
a misprint in the data or to a step that was not shown, such
as the conversion of dollars to rubles or of the old ruble
rate to the new ruble rate.
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Equation (1) is the Gregory model and is the foundation
of the Brada and Graves study. It will be referred to as
model (1) .
The second model deals with the hypothesis that there
has been a spillover of technical and managerial problems
from the civilian economy to the defense sector. As stated
in the previous chapter, difficulties in the civilian sector
are alleged to be slowing down the growth of aggregate
factor productivity thereby reducing the ability of Soviet
defense firms to develop and produce new weapons systems,
and lowering procurement below desired levels. Using this
hypothesis, Brada and Graves assumed that the time-path of
factor productivity growth in all industry reflects the
time-path of factor productivity growth in the defense
sector. Thus Soviet defense expenditures can be explained
as follows:
logSD^ = a + bi logUSD^ + b2 logSY^
+ b3 logSFP^ + ©t (2)
where:
SFP = the growth of Soviet factor productivity in
industry determined by an equation using the
percent change in Soviet industrial
production, employment, and capital stock.
The final two models developed by Brada and Graves bring
in to play the variable of the strategic gap between the
14
Soviet Union and the United States, measured by nuclear
warheads that each side could deliver. According to Brada
and Graves, this variable can also be used in the model to
test if there was a change in Soviet leadership's demand for
defense expenditures. The two models are as follows:
logSDt = a +hi logUSD^ +b2 logSY^ +b3 logSP^ +e^ (3)
and




SP-t = deliverable Soviet warheads/deliverable
U.S. warheads.
In Equation (3) the effect of procurement problems is
assumed not to exist, suggesting that only the achievement
of strategic parity was instrumental in the change in Soviet
defense expenditures. Equation (4) allows for the
possibility that both procurement problems and the
achievement of strategic parity have influenced Soviet
decisions on the share of GNP devoted to defense.
The measurement of strategic parity is a difficult issue
since it depends on both nuclear and non-nuclear forces.
The measure of parity used in the Brada-Graves study, the
15
number of warheads, is crude since the power of nuclear
weapons depends on the reliability and accuracy of the
delivery system, the yield of the warhead and the intended
target (cities vs. missiles). Nevertheless, to the extent
that the yield of U.S. weapons was smaller while Soviet
warheads were larger but less accurate, the use of number of
warheads reflects some of these qualitative differences more
effectively than would, for example, a comparison of
delivery vehicles or yields.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION
The data used in the replication of the Brada and Graves
study is contained in Appendix B. The estimates for the
data on Soviet defense expenditures were provided by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) . The CIA estimates are
considered more applicable than other independent estimates
for two reasons. First, there is a clearcut methodology and
they have access to data generally not available to others.
Second, the CIA estimates play a primary role in the United
States government's assessment of Soviet defense policies
and intentions and therefore play a major role in setting
U.S. defense policy. The method that the CIA uses to
construct the value of Soviet military expenditures is
through a building-block approach. Every new element of the
Soviet military force is valued at the price that it would
have if purchased in the United States. The objective is
not to establish the basis for international comparison but
to produce a summary indicator of the value of the Soviet
military effort in U.S. terms. This method of calculating
Soviet defense expenditures has some inadequacies. For
example, when the U.S. increased military pay in 1971 to
accomodate the coming of the all volunteer force it elicited
an artificial yet substantial increase in the CIA estimate
of Soviet defense expenditures [Ref. 3]. Also, applying
17
high U.S. labor rates to the labor-intensive Soviet military
can present a deceptively high estimate of Soviet defense
expenditures. Because of the obvious distortions that can
be created by this estimating procedure, the CIA no longer
reports its estimates in this manner. The 1988 edition of
"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers" reports
Soviet defense expenditures through 1984. Also, the Rand
Corporation's "Military Spending in Eastern Europe" of 1987
reports Soviet defense expenditures only through 1983.
Therefore, 1984 is the last year used in this study because
of the four year lag in reporting.
The first step in the replication of the Brada and
Graves study was to run regressions on the 25 years of data
using the following models:
logSDt = a + b^logUSOt + b2logSYt + ©^ (1)
logSDt = a + b^logUSD^ +b2logSYt + b3logSFPt + ®t (2)
logSDt = a + b^logUSD^ + b2logSYt + b3logSPt + e^ (3)
logSD^ = a + bjlogUSD^ + b2logSYt + b3logSFPt
+ b4logSPt + e^ (4)
The next step was to determine if the regression results
were appropriate for the entire sample period. To do this.
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I used a likelihood ratio, a chi-squared test, and a Chow
test to determine whether the sample period can be better
described by a single regression regime or by two separate
regressions, each with the same specification but with
different parameter estimates.
The likelihood ratio used is:
lambda = ((standard error of left side estimate)"^ *
(standard error of right side estimate) ^)/ (standard
error of total estimate) '^"*'"^,
where:
T = the number of years to the estimated
location of the unknown switching point
t = total number of years in the original
regression—T.
In the likelihood ratio test, lambda is minimized.
The procedure in using the likelihood ratio is as
follows. All possible divisions of the entire sample are
placed into a left-hand and a right-hand group. The left-
hand group runs from 1960 to the year of the estimated break
(T-years) and the right-hand group runs from the estimated
year of the break + 1 to 1984 (t-years) . A regression is
then run on each sample. The smallest sample that can be
used for a regression is n+2, where n equals the number of
variables. Therefore the first estimated break for model
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(1) is 1963 (T = 4 and t = 21) . The second break is
estimated to be at 1964 (T = 5 and t = 20) . This process is
continued for model (1) until T = 21 and t = 4. The standard
error from each regression is inserted into the likelihood
ratio and where lambda is minimized, the location of the
possible break is determined. This procedure is performed on
each model with the only difference being that three
variables need a sample size of at least five and four
variables need a sample size of at least six.
At this point we have determined that if there is a
break in the regression we know its location. The next step
is to run a chi-square test to test the hypothesis that no
break has taken place.
The chi-square distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is
an acceptable approximation to the distribution of -2 log
lambda [Ref. 4]. In their study, Brada and Graves simply
multiplied the minimized lambda of the likelihood ratio by
-2 log lambda and determined its significance using the chi-
square distribution with 4 degrees of freedom plus the
number of variables used. For example the degrees of
freedom for model (1) is 6. If the product of -2 log lambda
and the minimal likelihood ratio is significant it will
disprove the hypothesis that there is no break in the
regression estimate.
If there actually is a break in the regression, as
determined by the chi-squared test, the next and final
20
process is to determine whether the coefficients for the
pre-break period are significantly different from those of
the post-break period. This is done with the use of the
Chow test [Ref . 5]
.
The method involved can be described very simply.
Suppose that n observations are used to estimate a
regression with p parameters (p-1 coefficients plus one
intercept) . Suppoae also that there are m additional
observations, and we are interested in deciding whether they
are generated by the same regression model as the first n
observations. Performing the analysis of covariance
requires the following sums of squares:
1. A, the sum of squares of n + m deviations of the
dependent variable from the regression estimated by
n + m observations, with n + m - p degrees of freedom.
2. B, the sum of squares of n deviations of the dependent
variable from the regression estimated by the first n
observations, with n - p degrees of freedom.
3. C, the sum of squares of m deviations of the dependent
variable from the regression estimated by the second m
observations, with m - p degrees of freedom.
The ratio of (A - B - C)/p to (B + C)/(n + m - 2p) will
be distributed as F(p, n + m - 2p) under the null hypothesis
that both groups of observations belong to the same
regression model.
As an example, in model (1) A is equal to the error sum
of squares for the entire regression (data from 1960-1984),
B is equal to the error sum of squares of T years of data as
determined by the likelihood ratio and the chi-squared test
21
(T = n observations in the Chow ratio)
,
and C is equal to
the error sum of squares of t years of data (break + 1 to
1984) which is equal to m observations in the Chow ratio, p
is equal to 3 (intercept plus two variables) . The
significance can then be determined by comparing the Chow
ratio with the F distribution where p and (n + m -2p) are
the degrees of freedom.
In the next step, all of the tests were performed on the
data, but instead of having a high and a low estimate of
Soviet defense expenditure a mean of the two was used. The
results were then compared to the replication of the Brada
and Graves study.
The final process of this study involved the replacement
of the Growth of Soviet Factor Productivity variable with a
Warsaw Pact ratio of defense expenditures to GNP. The data
included was from 1965-1984. All the same tests were run
and the results were compared. Data used in this final
process are also included in Appendix B.
22
V. RESULTS
A. REPLICATION AND MEAN DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Tables I and II are the parameter estimates for the
Brada and Graves study using the CIA's low and high
estimates for Soviet defense expenditures. Tables III and
IV are the results of a replication of their study. Table V
is the parameter estimates using the mean of the low and
high estimates of the Soviet defense expenditures. For
equations using low estimates of Soviet defense expenditures
TABLE I
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDL, 1960-1984












































Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level
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TABLE II
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDH, 1960-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant -2.8811 -2.6610 -1.9920 -2.2021
(-5.399)* (-5.641)* (-2.812)* (-3.364)*
log USD 0.1046 0.1196 0.0562 0.0909
(1.442) (1.885)*** (0.758) (1.307)
log SY 1.0661 1.0181 0.9694 0.9715
(28.086)* (27.357)* (14.981)* (16.413)*
log SEP -0.0200 -0.0172
(-2.820)* (-2.259)**
log SP 0.0573 0.0316
(1.802)*** (1.011)
r2 0.9767 0.9823 0.9789 0.9824
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
(SDL), Table I, the parameter estimates for United States
defense expenditures (USD) and for Soviet GNP(SY) are
significant in all specifications and are relatively stable.
A one percent increase in United States defense outlays
yields an increase of 0.14-0.20 percent in Soviet defense
expenditures. The elasticity of defense outlays with
respect to Soviet GNP is significantly greater than zero in
all specifications. Soviet factor productivity (SEP) is
significant in model (4), but with a negative sign. This
indicates that the slowdown in industrial productivity has
had no negative effect on defense outlays. It could even
24
TABLE III
REPLICATION FOR EQUATIONS SDL, 1960-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant -3.2864 -3.1847 -3.8597 -3.0712
(-6.71)* (-6.70)* (-5.72)* (-6.89)*
log USD 0.1432 0.1609 0.1744 0.2297
(2.15) ** (2.48)** (2.47)** (3.49)*
log SY 1.0621 1.0310 1.1244 1.1295









r2 0.982 0.984 0.983 0.987
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
mean that increased defense outlays may be the cause of a
decline in productivity in the civilian economy, or that a
fall in the opportunity cost of investing in defense causes
more to be invested in defense. The strategic parity
variable is significant only in model (4) and has a negative
sign. Therefore, the closer the Soviet Union comes to
strategic parity with the United States, the lower are
Soviet defense outlays.
Table II results for the high estimate of Soviet defense
expenditures (SDH) differ only slightly from those in Table
I. There is a general lack of significance of the USD
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TABLE IV
REPLICATION FOR EQUATIONS SDH, 1960-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant -2.8812 -2.6875 -1.9921 -2.3565
(-5.40)* (-6.06)* (-2.81)* (-3.72)*
log USD 0.1046 0.1383 0.0562 0.1158
(1.44) (2.28)** (0.76) (1.69)
log SY 1.0661 1.0070 0.9694 0.9749
(28.09)* (28.11)* (14.98)* (17.22)*
log SFP -0.02818 -0.0253
(-3.38)* (-2.73)**
log SP 0.0573 0.0226
(1.80)*** (0.74)
r2 0.979 0.986 0.982 0.987
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
variable which means that it is not as useful as a predictor
of Soviet defense expenditures. Also, there is a lower
elasticity of defense outlays with respect to SY. The sign
of SFP is negative for SDH as it was for SDL. An
interesting difference is that the coefficient for SP is
positive. This means that the closer the Soviets are to
achieving strategic parity with the United States, the more
resources they devote to defense. This can be interpreted
as a more competitive behavior than the results of SDL.
Tables III and IV, the replication, indicate the same
results as Tables I and II. The only difference is the
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TABLE V
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDM, 19 60-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4^
Constant -3.0712 -2.9185 -2.8275 -3.1793
(-6.66)* (-7.30)* (-4.33)* (-5.55)*
log USD 0.1223 0.1489 0.1091 0.1666
(1.95)** (2.72)*'- (1.60) (2.69)**
log SY 1.0645 1.0179 1.0380 1.0432
(32.47)* (31.50)* (17.40)* (20.36)*
log SFP -0.0222 -0.0245
(-2.95)* (-2.92)*
log SP 0.0157 -0.0178
(0.54) (-0.64)
r2 0.984 0.989 0.984 0.989
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
slightly different outcomes when the Soviet factor
productivity (SFP) variable was used. This difference was
not significant and caused no change in the conclusions.
Table V displays the parameter estimates for the
equations using the mean of the estimated Soviet defense
expenditures as the dependent variable. The USD variable is
significant in all four equations and therefore is a useful
predictor of Soviet defense expenditures. As with Table I,
the elasticity of defense outlays with respect to Soviet GNP
is significantly greater than zero in all specifications.
The coefficient on Soviet factor productivity, SFP, is
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significantly negative in model (2) and model (4) . This
further strengthens the argument that the slowdown in
industrial productivity has had no negative effect on
defense outlays. The major difference in Table V is that
the strategic parity variable is not significant in model
(3) or model (4). This suggests that attitudes toward
strategic parity by Soviet leaders had no effect on Soviet
defense expenditures.
From the first five tables it can be concluded that
Soviet defense expenditures are clearly related to Soviet
GNP and, in the case of SDL and SDM, to United States
defense expenditures, in the same way as assumed by Gregory.
The results also indicate, for the sample period used, that
Soviet factor productivity growth in industry by way of
lower opportunity costs has also been an important
determinant of Soviet defense outlays, but opposite to the
way it was postulated. In the case of the strategic balance
between the Soviet Union and the United States, the effect
on defense expenditures differs. For SDL, expenditures are
lowered as parity is neared. For SDH expenditures are
increased as parity is neared. For SDM, nearing parity has
no significant effect on defense expenditures.
The next step was to determine if the regression results
were appropriate for the entire sample period or if there
had been a change in Soviet attitudes toward defense outlays
during the sample period.
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Brada ' s and Graves's results for the three tests
performed to determine if and where there was a break in the
regressions are reported in Table VI. Again, a replication
of the Brada and Graves tests was performed. The only
difference was that the Chi-squared and Chow test results in
the replication for models that included Soviet factor
productivity growth in industry, SFP, were insignificantly
different from those in the Brada and Graves study and still
TABLE VI
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lead to the same conclusions. Therefore, the results of the
replication of tests to determine if there are breaks in the
regressions are not shown.
The Year of Break column indicates the last year of the
first period that was determined by the likelihood ratio.
The likelihood ratio only determined where the break would
occur if there actually was a break. The Chi-squared test
determined if there actually was a break, and the Chow test
determined if the break was significant.
In the Brada and Graves study the tests indicated the
presence of a structural break in the regression regime for
all specifications and for both SDL and SDH. The Chow test
generally confirmed that significant differences exist
between the regression coefficients of the pre- and post-
break samples despite the small sample size and high
collinearity . This leads to the conclusion that the use of
the regression results reported in Tables I and II to
explain Soviet defense expenditures over the entire sample
period is not appropriate. Also, the structural breaks
occur when SFP and SP are included as explanatory variables,
which means that the achievement of strategic parity with
the United States and the difficulties experienced by the
Soviet economy by themselves cannot explain the slowdown in
Soviet defense expenditures. The relationship between
Soviet defense expenditures and the explanatory variables
changed at some point within the sample period, indicating
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either a change in military doctrine or a change in the
leaders' preferences. There are three cases where the break
occurs in the 1960s. In all three cases not all explanatory
variables are included in the specification, and Brada and
Graves believe that these breaks reflect the effects of
missing variables.
The tests for structural breaks using SDM produce the
same results as the tests using SDL. One result that Brada
and Graves did not point out, and which also showed up in
the structural break tests using SDM, is that, according to
my calculations, the Chow test for SDL model (3) and (4) is
not significant. This would indicate that although there is
a structural break at 1976, the pre- and post-break
regressions are not all that different.
Tables VII, VIII, and IX report parameter estimates
obtained by estimating models (l)-(4) over the two sample
periods as determined in Table VI.
The replication of the Brada and Graves study for
parameter estimates on the basis of structural breaks will
not be discussed because the results confirm the outcome of
the Brada and Graves study. There were some insignificant
defferences in the estimates for models (2) and (4), but
they did not change any of the conclusions.
Some basic conclusions can be drawn from Tables VII-IX.
For SDL all specifications show a decrease in the elasticity
of Soviet defense expenditures with respect to Soviet GNP
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TABLE VII
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDL
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Model (1) Model (2)
Variable 1960-65 1966-84 1960-69 1970-84
Constant -13.863 -2.925 -3.780 -2.741
(-2.877)*** (-8.069)* (-1.557)*** (-7.168)*
log USD 1.181 0.115 0.232 0.047
(1.751) (3.061)* (0.154) (1.186)
log SY 1.975 1.027 1.089 1.053
(6.007)* (30.570)* (4.589)* (22.698)*
log SEP -0.100 -0.004
(-0.058) (-1.204)
r2 0.9290 0.9883 0.9718 0.9869
Model (3) Model (4)
Variable 1960-76 1977-84 1960-76 1977-84
Constant -4.649 2.127 -4.278 2.124
(-5.174)* (3.923)** (-5.113)* (3.263)**
log USD 0.258 0.151 0.245 0.151
(2.607)** (5.080)** (2.719)** (4.399)**
log SY 1.173 0.204 1.134 0.204
(15.841)* (1.922)*** (16.188)* (1.638)***
log SFP -0.039 -0.000
(-1.953)** (-0.016)
log SP -0.087 0.174 -0.068 0.174
(-1.738)*** (12.956)* (-1.451)*** (10.216)*
r2 0.9714 0.9982 0.9783 0.9982
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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TABLE VIII
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDH
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Model fl) Model (2)
Variable 1960-69 1970-84 1960-72 1973-84
Constant -2.187 -5.024 -2.217 -5.109
(-2.891)** (-11.571)* (-5.507)* (-8.795)*
log USD 0.0001 0.143 0.208 0.053
(0.000) (2.867) ** (2.686) ** (0.546)
log SY 1.045 1.379 0.871 1.467






r2 0.9345 0.9859 0.9846 0.9789
Model f3^ Model (A)
Variable 1960-76 1977-84 1960-73 1974-84




log USD 0.099 0.191 0.173 0.252
(1.162) (3.045) ** (2.516) ** (1.965) ***
log SY 0.990 0.512 0.889 0.525





log SP -0.041 0.203 -0.000 0.139
(-0.954) (7.163) (-0.025) (1.950)***
r2 0.9735 0.9960 0.9797 0.9714
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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TABLE IX
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDM
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Model fl) Model (2)
Variable 1960-65 1966-84 1960-69 1970-84
Constant -11.827 -3.7819 -2.9482 -3.8521
(-2.85)*** (-8.57)* (-5.15)* (-9.40)*
log USD 1.0710 0.1626 0.2347 0.1093
(1.84) (3.55)* (1.35) (2.54)**
log SY 1.7369 1.1454 0.9570 1.2010
(6.13)* (28.00)* (7.17)* (23.08)*
log SEP -0.0861 -0.0076
(-3.01)** (-1.51)
r2 0.931 0.986 0.974 0.989
Model (3) Model (4)
Variable 1960-76 1977-84 1960-76 1977-84
Constant -3.442 1.0545 -3.0910 1.1813
(-4.23)* (1.51) (-4.18)* (1.39)
log USD 0.1694 0.1736 0.1573 0.1706
(1.89)*** (4.53)* (1.98)*** (3.89)*
log SY 1.0708 0.3785 1.0332 0.3612
(15.98)* (2.77)** (16.69)* (2.26)***
log SEP -0.0362 0.0009
(-2.14)*** (0.40)
log SP -0.0614 0.1902 -0.0427 0.1955
(-1.35) (10.95)* (-1.03) (8.3)*
r2 0.973 0.998 0.981 0.998
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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from the first period to the second. For SDH the elasticity
of Soviet defense expenditures with respect to USD is higher
in the post-break period rather than lower. For SDM the
first two models have an increasing elasticity for USD
because of insignificant pre-break parameters, while the
last two models show an increasing elasticity with both pre-
break and post-break parameters being significant. SFP
tends not to play a significant role in determining the
level of SDL except in model (4) where it is significant
only at the 10% level for the pre-break period. On the
other hand, Strategic parity is generally significant. An
interesting outcome is that in all the Tables SP is negative
in the pre-break period and positive in the post-break
period. This would suggest that before the break the
Soviet Union reduced defense expenditures as its number of
nuclear weapons increased relative to that of the United
States and that the Soviet Union was only seeking strategic
parity with the United States. But after the break the
higher the ratio of Soviet to United States warheads, the
greater the Soviet defense expenditures. This could reflect
a change in the Soviet strategy to one of being more
competitive.
To summarize, the only major difference in the three
tables is that in the SDL table the elasticity of Soviet
defense expenditures with respect to USD tends to decrease
inthe post-break period while it tends to increase in the
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SDH table. In the SDM table the elasticity decreases in the
first two models and increases in the last two. This
suggests that a change in the views of Soviet leadership
toward strategic parity had an effect on the elasticity of
Soviet defense expenditures with respect to United States
defense expenditures. Another important conclusion that can
be drawn is that Soviet attitudes toward defense outlays
changed sometime in the mid-1970s so that the expenditures
became less responsive to the growth rate of Soviet GNP.
Using the mean of the Soviet defense expenditures and
working through the models gives more credibility to these
conclusions.
Brada and Graves produced the results of projections and
the actual level of Soviet defense expenditures in their
study but made an error by reversing the year of the break
for SDL and SDH in their table. Conclusions were made from
a SDL break in 1973 that should have been 1976 and a SDH
break in 1976 should have been 1973. Therefore, the results
are not entirely accurate.
The level of Soviet defense outlays for the post-break
period, 1977-1984, using the pre-break parameters and the
post-break parameters for Equation (4) , as reported in Table
IX, were computed to show the implications of changes in
attitude for Soviet defense expenditures. The results of
the projections and the actual level of Soviet defense
expenditures are reported in Table X. This table was
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TABLE X
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED SOVIET DEFENSE



































computed and conclusions were drawn even though the Chow
test was insignificant. An insignificant Chow test would
indicate that although a change took place it would only
have a negligible effect. The table was produced and
discussed to form a comparison with the Brada and Graves
study.
Projections based on the pre-break coefficients show
what Soviet defense spending would have been had the
leadership's attitudes toward such outlays not changed.
Generally the mean actual expenditures are higher than the
pre-break coefficient projections, which indicates a change
toward increased spending. This means that although there
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was a definite break in the regression, the variables used
do not show a decrease in expenditures but rather a change
to a more hawkish attitude by the Soviet leaders.
Projections based on the post-break coefficients are the
model's predictions of Soviet defense outlays reflecting the
altered Soviet decisionmaking process. There is a very
close fit between the mean of the CIA's estimates of SDL and
SDH and the projections based on post-break coefficients.
Also important is that the estimates based on post-break
coefficients represent a much more stable pattern of defense
expenditures than do the estimates based on pre-break
coefficients. This should prove very soundly that the mean
of the high and low defense expenditure estimates for the
period 1960-1984 can be used to show a change in Soviet
leaders' attitude toward a more hawkish policy involving
defense expenditures.
B. MODIFICATION OF INPUT DATA
In Part A, Soviet factor productivity was found not to
be a cause of the slowdown in the growth of Soviet defense
expenditures. This study was therefore performed again with
the variable of Warsaw Pact (less Soviet) defense
expenditures (WPD) used in place of SFP. Because of the
inability to get all the necessary data the test period is
from 1965-1984. WPD is actually the Warsaw Pact (less
Soviet) defense expenditures divided by Warsaw Pact (less
Soviet) GNP [Ref. 6]. Using a ratio provides a consistent
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variable to be used in the models. After performing all the
tests with current year WPD and again with a one year lag, I
found that a one year lag of WPD gave a better fit in that
the coefficient of determination (R^) was higher in the one
year lag WPD.
Tables XI, XII, and XIII give the parameter estimates
for models (1) through (4) for SDL, SDH, and SDM. It is
noteworthythat WPD is significant in all specifications at
the 1% level. Also, SP is generally not a significant
predictor of Soviet defense expenditures in any of the
models. The elasticity of defense outlays with respect to
Soviet GNP is significantly greater than zero in all
specifications of SDH and SDM. The sign for SP was
different in all three tables, but because of its
insignificance no conclusions were drawn.
The next step was to determine, using the likelihood
ratio, chi-squared, and Chow tests, if there were any breaks
in the regressions. The results are displayed in Table XIV.
The Chi-squared test indicates that there was a structural
break in all the regressions except for SDH when only USD
and SY variables were used. This adds credence to the
previous determination that the break is basically
determined by the variable SP.
Tables XV through XVII show parameter estimates obtained
by estimating models (l)-(4) over the two sample periods as
determined in Table XIV. All specifications show a decrease
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TABLE XI
PAPIAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDL, 1966-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant -2.9251 -2.8847 -2.5018 -3.5214
(-8.07)* (-9.47)* (-3.22)* (-4.79)*
log USD 0.11524 0.1033 0.09118 0.13727
(3.06)* (3.24)* (1.67)*** (2.86)*
log SY 1.02664 0.95571 0.98014 1.01031
(30.57)* (25.11)* (11.88)* (14.65)*
log WPD -0.16025 -0.19722
(-2.77)* (-2.83)*
log SP -0.01617 -0.02468
(-0.62) (-0.95)
r2 0.988 0.992 0.989 0.993
/ Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
in the elasticity of Soviet defense expenditures with
respect to United States defense expenditures. The
elasticity of Soviet defense expenditures with respect to
Soviet GNP is erratic as far as increasing or decreasing in
the post-break period but is still generally significant in
all specifications. An important point is that WPD is
generally significant and also changes its elasticity from
positive to negative in the models where both pre-break and
post-break WPD was significant. This indicates that in the
pre-break period the Soviets increased their defense
spending as the block countries spending increased. But
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TABLE XII
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDH, 1966-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant -4.4379 -4.3730 -3.810 -5.468
(-8.23)* (-10.07)* (-3.30)* (-5.429)*
log USD 0.19870 0.17953 0.16298 0.23794
(3.55)* (3.95)* (2.01)** (3.53)*
log SY 1.23895 1.12510 01.1699 1.21901
(24.79)* (20.74)* (9.53)* (12.59)*
log WPD -0.25717 -0.32073
(-3.12)* (-3.27)*
log SP 0.02399 0.04243
(0.62) (1.17)
r2 0.981 0.989 0.982 0.990
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
after the break, Soviet defense spending decreased when the
Soviet block countries' defense expenditures increased.
This shows that Soviet leaders decided to let the block
countries carry a larger burden of the defense needs. The
last major point is that in all the pre-break periods the
Soviets reduced defense spending as they neared strategic
parity with the United States, but in the post-break period
they increased defense expenditures as they neared parity.
This reflects a change to a more competitive policy on the
part of Soviet leadership.
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TABLE XIII
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS SDM, 1966-1984
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model r4)
Constant -3.7819 -3.7279 -3.2472 -4.6231
(-6.57)* (-10.62)* (-3.44)* (-5.54)*
log USD 0.16261 0.14665 0.13222 0.19441
(3.55)* (3.99)* (1.99)** (3.57)*
log SY 1.14542 1.05062 1.0867 1.12740
(28.00)* (23.95)* (10.83)* (14.41)*
log WPD -0.21416 -0.26613
(-3.22)* (-3.36)*
log SP 0.02042 -0.03469
(0.64) (-1.18)**
r2 0.986 0.992 0.986 0.992
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
The final table is a comparison of the actual and
estimated Soviet defense expenditures calculated on a pre-
break and post-break basis for SDM. All the estimates are
much closer to the actual defense expenditures when using
the post-break coefficients. More important, all of the
pre-break estimates were lower than the actual mean
dependent variable: this suggests that the change in
attitude of the Soviet leaders caused an increase in defense
spending. In the post-break period for the low estimated






















































































expenditures decreases in 1977 and 1978, increases from 1979
to 1982, and decreases in 1983 and 1984.
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TABLE XV
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDL
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Model fl) Model (2)







































Model (3) Model (4)

















































Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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TABLE XVI
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDH
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Model (1) Model (2)
Variable 1966-80 1981-84 1966-70 1971-84




log USD 0.129 -0.290 0.394 0.141
(1.50)*** (-5.07)* (223.06)* (2.92)*
log SY 1.135 1.90 0.869 1.283






r2 0.974 0.9859 1.000 0.991
Model (3) Model M)
Variable 1966-76 1977-84 1966- 71 1972-84




log USD 0.287 0.191 0.176 0.152
(2.54)** (3.04) ** (4.14) *** (2.00) **
log SY 1.295 0.512 0.577 1.241





log SP -0.096 0.203 0.069 0.007
(-2.13)** (7.16)* (3.00) (0.15)
0.980 0.996 0.999 0.988
Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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TABLE XVII
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EQUATIONS EXPLAINING SDM
ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Variable
Model (1) Model (2)
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Notes: t-ratio in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
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TABLE XVIII
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED SOVIET DEFENSE


































It was shown in this study, as well as in the Brada and
Graves study, that Soviet defense expenditures have a
decreasing dependence on Soviet GNP and on the level of
United States defense expenditures, and that Soviet defense
expenditures' dependence on the strategic balance between
the Soviet Union and the United States changed in the mid-
7 0s. This study went on further to show that the defense
outputs of Soviet block countries also have an effect on
Soviet defense expenditures. That is, prior to the inid-70s
change in in Soviet leaders' attitude, as Soviet block
countries' defense expenditures increased, so also did
Soviet defense expenditures increase. But, after the break,
as Soviet block countries' defense expenditures increased
Soviet defense expnditures decreased. For further study
there are a number of other variables that could be tested
in the models, such as non-U. S. NATO defense espenditures or
the ratio of non-Soviet WPD/non-U.S. NATO defense
expenditures
.
In the Brada and Graves study there was a difference in
the outcomes for pre-break and post-break expenditures for
the high and low dependent variable estimates. For the high
estimates there was an indicated increase in defense
expenditures for the post-break period. For the low
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estimate there was a decrease in defense expenditures for
the post break period. Using a mean of the high and low
input in the models resulted in an increase in defense
expenditures for the post-break period.
In the tests using the Warsaw Pact defense expenditure
variable, the post-break period showed an increase in
defense expenditures for both the mean and high estimated
inputs. However, for the low estimited dependent variable,
the post-break period showed no consistent increase or
decrease in defense expenditures. This was probably due to
an unknown variable affecting the outcome of the models.
This could also be a subject for further study.
The major point brought out by this study is that there
was a change in the mid-70s in the attitude of the Soviet
leadership regarding defense needs, but the variables used
in showing this indicate an increase in defense expenditures
rather than a decrease. Another difference between this and
the Brada and Graves study is that this study determined
that not just the view of Soviet leaders on strategic parity
with the United States changed. What also changed was the
Soviet attitude toward the sharing of defense
responsibilities with the other Warsaw Pact countries.
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REGRESSION RESULTS - MODEL (1)




Coefficient of multiple determination (R^) = 0.83.
t values are given below their respective coefficients in
parentheses. Standard error = 0.11.



















SD = 0.82 + 0.055 USD - 0.003 SY R^ = 0.22
(1.96) Standard error =0.87
SD = 0.54 + 0.055 USD r2 = 0.21
(2.02) Standard error = 0.84
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APPENDIX B
BRADA AND GRAVES DATA TABLE
Real U.S.
Soviet Defense Defense Soviet Growth of
(billion Expenditures GNP Soviet Factor Nuclear
1970 rubles (billion (billion Productivity Warheads














































































1979 75 59 156.80 516.1 0.17 6336 9945
1980 79 62 160.67 524.7 0.27 7451 9668
1981 83 63 169.55 536.1 0.47 7793 9628
1982 84 64 185.31 547.0 0.07 8031 10124
1983 88 66 201.83 567.5 1.50 8730 10201
1984 90 67 211.35 578.9 1.63 9146 10630
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